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Introduction 
 
On December 18th, 2006, Traian Băsescu, elected president of Romania, held a 
speech in Parliament, in which he condemned the communist political system of 
Romania since 1945 until 1989 as illegitimate and criminal. The condemnation was 
based on an official document, the famous Tismăneanu Report, which thoroughly 
documented the criminal and illegitimate character of the Romanian communist 
regime.  
However, one of the recurrent questions in the public debate generated by this 
action was: How sincere and credible is the act of condemning the Romanian 
communist political system when it is done by a political elite dominated by former 
members of the Communist Party? Behind this question seems to lay an ad hominem 
argument. Yet, ad hominem argumentation, a refuting strategy frequently 
encountered in the media, is quite controversial in contemporary theories of 
argumentation: in its standard interpretation, this type of argument is considered a 
fallacy, either in handbooks of logic and critical thinking, or in highly elaborated 
theories such as pragma-dialectics. On the other hand, there are authors who try to 
defend the use of this type of argumentation: in the 50s, Henry W. Johnstone Jr 
claimed not only that ad hominem argumentation is not fallacious, but that it is the 
only valid argument in philosophy; in contemporary debates, Douglas Walton 
considers this type of argument as not being fallacious in its every occurrence: it can 
be just a weak argument (as opposed to a strong one), or an insufficiently supported 
argument, or even a cogent argument. Much of the debate around the ad hominem 
argument, as far as its acceptability is concerned, focuses on terminology and 
identification of its historical roots; researchers are interested in distinguishing 
between its various forms, and in evaluating each form thus resulted.  
The purpose of this paper is to make a connection between ad hominem 
argumentation and the problem of legitimation. The connection is suggested by a 
case study which will anticipate a common pattern of argumentation in the debates 
around the condemnation of the communist regime. Three fragments from editorials 
in important Romanian newspapers will be analysed, all having in common the 
problematic interaction between legitimation and credibility, on the one hand, and 
institutions and persons representing institutions on the other hand. Adopting 
Waltonřs view on ad hominem arguments as ethotic arguments, but reframing the 
concept of ethos in a rhetorical context, I will try to prove that in certain cases 
credibility and legitimation substitute each other, and that insights from 
argumentation theory might be relevant for the way legitimation is analyzed in 
critical discourse analysis.  
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1. A case study about an anthological example 
 
There is a famous passage in the New Testament which proves, I think, both the 
difficulties arising when approaching ad hominem fallacies and the connection 
between this argumentative strategy and the problem of legitimation. I will try to 
illustrate this by providing two alternative readings of this fragment. 
(1)  
8:1 Jesus went unto the mount of Olives.  
8:2 And early in the morning he came again into the temple, and all the people came unto 
him; and he sat down, and taught them.  
8:3 And the scribes and Pharisees brought unto him a woman taken in adultery; and when 
they had set her in the midst,  
8:4 They say unto him: Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act.  
8:5 Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned: but what sayest thou?  
8:6 This they said, tempting him, that they might have to accuse him. But Jesus stooped 
down, and with his finger wrote on the ground, as though he heard them not.  
8:7 So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto them: He that 
is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her.  
8:8 And again he stooped down, and wrote on the ground.  
8:9 And they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one, 
beginning at the eldest, even unto the last; and Jesus was left alone, and the woman 
standing in the midst.  
8:10 When Jesus had lifted up himself, and saw none but the woman, he said unto her: 
Woman, where are those thine accusers? Hath no man condemned thee?  
8:11 She said: No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her: Neither do I condemn thee: go, and 
sin no more. (John, 8, my emphasis) 
On the one hand, this fragment could be read as a dialogue illustrating the lack 
of legitimacy of an institution (Ŗthe law of Mosesŗ). Habermas defines legitimation 
crisis as a crisis of the input of the political system, which requires an input of mass 
loyalty as diffuse as possible: Ŗa legitimation deficit means that it is not possible by 
administrative means to maintain or establish effective normative structures to the 
extent required.ŗ (Habermas 1988: 47) The legitimation crisis that Jesus is supposed 
to trigger in the judicial system of Pharisees has its source in the fact that even 
Pharisees, known for their strict observance of rites and ceremonies of the written 
law and for insistence on the validity of their own oral traditions concerning the law, 
could not have enough authority to apply the law, since they were not themselves 
without sin. 
On the other hand, analysing the argumentation involved in the dialogue 
between Jesus and the Pharisees reveals a very interesting interaction: the 
Pharisees try, appealing to an ex concessis argument, to catch Jesus in a difficult 
situation. Jesus had made two previous public statements, which can be conceived as 
conceded premises in a dialectical game:  
ŖThink not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish 
them but to fulfil them.ŗ (Matthew, 5.17) 
meaning that He wouldnřt contest the rules included in the law of Moses, and  
ŖJudge not, that you be not judged. (...) Why do you see the speck that is in your brother's 
eye, but do not notice the log that is in your own eye. Or how can you say to your brother, 
`Let me take the speck out of your eye,' when there is the log in your own eye? You 
hypocrite, first take the log out of your own eye, and then you will see clearly to take the 
speck out of your brother's eye.ŗ (Matthew, 7.1-5) 
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meaning that one should first be aware of his own defects before accusing others. 
The reconstructed ex concessis argument of the Pharisees, who were looking for a 
way of accusing Him (or so the Evangelist warns us), might be: If Jesus acted 
according to the law of Moses and condemned the woman taken in adultery, then He 
would contradict His previous claim Judge not, that you be not judged, meaning that 
He would be defeated in an argumentative game, in front of a wide audience, and 
that would be a serious face-loss which may result in a discrediting of Jesus in front 
of his followers; if Jesus didnřt condemn the woman according to the law of Moses, 
then He would contradict his previous claim that He would not contest Mosesř law, 
which would be both a defying of the law, hence a reason for having Him retained, 
and also a defeat of Jesus in an argumentative game, with the same consequences as 
in the first case. 
In this difficult situation, Jesus seems to appeal to an apparent refutation, a 
misconception of refutation in Aristotleřs terms (Aristotle S.F.: 1672a 20), or a shift 
from problem to person Ŕ i.e. an ad hominem argument of the tu quoque kind: ŖHe 
that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at herŗ Ŕ meaning that He 
shifts the discussion from the initial issue (if the woman should be stoned or not Ŕ 
i.e. if Mosesř law should be observed or not) to a different one (if the Pharisees had 
the moral authority to apply the law), so that He successfully avoids committing to 
any of the disadvantageous alternatives. Of course the Pharisees might have replied: 
ŖWe have asked you to tell us if she should be stoned or not, we didnřt ask who 
should carry it out.ŗ Instead, the evangelist just lets us know that Jesusř speech act 
was efficient: ŖAnd they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, 
went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto the last.ŗ 
Granted that my double reading is correct, this argument from the New 
Testament is interesting for several reasons. First, assuming the naïve point of view 
that ad hominem arguments are always fallacies, we should explain in what resides 
the apparent cogency of this argument. Second, we should question the putative 
fallacious aspect of ad hominem arguments. Third, we need to investigate the 
relations between ad hominem arguments and the discursive strategies for gaining 
or contesting legitimacy. And finally, we have to admit that the type of argument 
used by Jesus in this encounter has become a sort of locus comunis in argumentative 
strategies, universally accepted in various cultures either by adopting the quote from 
the Gospel as an adage or by providing local forms, like in the Romanian saying: 
laughs the crock at the cracked pot. [1] 
But the most relevant aspect for this study is that much of the media debate on 
the condemnation of communism by president Traian Băsescu focused exactly on 
this type of argument, as the next examples, fragments from editorials and opinion 
articles published in major Romanian newspapers, could prove: 
(2) In the Romanian Parliament, a moment of so-called condemnation of communism was 
consumed. It was: 
An immoral moment. Was Traian Băsescu the most entitled character to take upon 
himself the condemnation of communism? Of course not. 
Traian Băsescu did not spend a single day in prison. The censorship did not reject a single 
book of his because he wrote none. Not for a moment was he forced to wash toilets 
although he had a faculty diploma. He never had a single moment of protest, a single 
moment of grumbling. During communism he made an exquisite career, which was denied 
to others of his colleagues: the youngest ship captain of the Romanian fleet, chief of office 
in Anvers, chief of the Inspectorate of the Civil Navigation, appointed in November 1989 
with the consent of Elena Ceauşescu. According to his own statements, in December 1989 
he had in his house the incredible amount of 60.000$, a sum equal to the budget of a steel 
plant. Traian Băsescu justifies his career and wealth as the result of his talent and 
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education. Letřs admit it. Doesnřt he contradict the speech he delivered in Parliament 
which depicted communism as a criminal regime?  
(excerpt from Ion Cristoiu, An Immoral and Useless Moment, Jurnalul Naţional, 
December 20, 2006) 
(3) The day after Băsescuřs speech. At calm. 
anca: I cannot agree with you. 
anca: I donřt find Băseřs initiative OK. 
anca: maybe if it came from someone younger. 
Costin: It could come even from Ceauşescu.  
Costin: it would still be good. (…) 
anca: as they say: one needs a thief to recognize a thief.  
anca: and a mad man to reckon a mad man.  
anca: at least as long as the communism still exists in Romania, hidden in bureaucratic 
structures as is ours.  
(excerpt from Costin Ilie, On Condemning Communism on Messenger, Cotidianul, 
December 20, 2006) 
 (4) Itřs a communistic fallacy to qualify this speech as immoral or useless on the grounds 
that it is delivered by a successful product of communism, who, besides, has major 
deficiencies of demeanour. Even if it were uttered by one such as C. V. Tudor, were he to be 
elected president of Romania, the speech would not be less valid. Drunk or sober, thief or 
honest man, liar or sincere, Traian Băsescu is the elected president of the Romanian state. 
The condemnation of communism under the authority of the highest position in the state is 
important for the moral situation of Romania. 
Nothing can obliterate that. Not the fact that Mr Băsescu lacks familiarity with and does 
not believe in many of the things he uttered. Not even the fact that he uses this moment to 
grossly insult the democratically elected leadership of SDP, interfering aggressively and 
arbitrarily in the internal affairs of a party. Nor the indiscriminate attacks towards the 
press. Mr Băsescu, as a person, is and remains a political animal, not a moral authority. 
(excerpt from Cristian Tudor Popescu, The Word that Creates Thought, Gândul, December 
21, 2006) 
Ion Cristoiuřs text shares important similarities with the fragment from the 
Bible. From an argumentative point of view, both texts are based on a supposed 
inconsistency: how can a person who has sinned condemn another? And how can a 
person who was privileged during the communist period condemn communism? That 
means that both the Pharisees and Traian Băsescu lack the moral authority to apply 
the law, respectively to condemn communism. Yet, in both cases there is a hidden ad 
hominem argumentation: the problem is shifted from the legitimacy of a law or 
official decision to the legitimacy of the person who occupies the relevant position to 
carry out that action. So, the more general question to be answered is: does a person 
need moral authority to legitimately engage in a moral act?  
The other two texts might be viewed as replies to Cristoiuřs argument (in fact, 
Popescuřs article is an overt answer to Cristoiu). The article from Cotidianul tries to 
show that the value of the condemnation of communism should be assessed 
independently of the person who occupies the relevant position to do it, although 
Traian Băsescuřs being a former communist might be considered an advantage for 
the success of the act (Ŗone needs a thief to recognize a thiefŗ). So, Cristoiuřs ad 
hominem argument is turned against the initial claim, the very reasons used by 
Cristoiu to delegitimate the condemnation being thus used to legitimate it.  
Popescuřs answer is based on a distinction between the institution of presidency, 
which is sufficient to legitimate the condemnation of communism, and the person 
who holds the position of president, considering any remarks about Băsescuřs person 
as not only irrelevant for the problem of legitimacy, but even fallacious.  
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Ad hominem arguments are quite controversial in contemporary theories of 
argumentation and much of the controversy aims at identifying types of this 
argument and establishing standards for evaluating their fallacious character. In 
order to see the connections between the problem of legitimacy and the acceptability 
of ad hominem argumentation, we have to clarify the controversies regarding its 
typology and its reasonableness, controversies generated by different historical 
traditions that led to the contemporary perspectives about ad hominem 
argumentation. 
 
 
2. History of ad hominem arguments 
 
The first problem that arises when attempting a detailed analysis of ad hominem 
arguments is generated by the lack of terminological consistency in defining various 
subtypes of this argument. Confronting the bibliography provided in this paper, one 
could find no less than ten names for various subtypes, some of them redundant: 
abusive ad hominem (or ad personam argument), circumstantial ad hominem, ex 
concessis ad hominem, ad hominem argument based on a pragmatic inconsistency 
(roughly the same as ex concessis), tu quoque ad hominem (or two wrongs), bias ad 
hominem, Ŗpoisoning the wellŗ ad hominem, and guilt by association. This 
terminological variety reflects a confusion in the typology of ad hominem arguments, 
confusion generated by the historical evolution of this type of argument. As the 
meaning of the term Ŗad hominem argumentŗ changed throughout the history of 
logic, a brief outline of these changes will be relevant. 
In his fundamental book, C. L. Hamblin identifies the first use of the term 
Ŗargumentum ad hominemŗ in John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. (Hamblin 1970: 159-162) In a fragment often ignored by publishers 
and sometimes even by experts, in a parenthetical passage to the main discussion, 
quoted in full by Hamblin, Locke mentions Ŗfour sorts of arguments that men, in 
their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent, or 
at least, so to awe them as to silence their oppositionŗ (idem: 159) The first one, says 
Locke, might be called argumentum ad verecundiam, and is used by those who, being 
modest, adopt the arguments of those who earned a certain reputation, instead of 
producing their own arguments. This case covers what we might call today argument 
from authority (either a relevant authority, or not). The second argument might be 
called argumentum ad ignorantiam, used when one requires his opponent to admit 
the argument already advanced or to produce a better argument for his thesis. The 
third one employs the strategy of Ŗpressing a man with consequences drawn from his 
own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name of argumentum 
ad hominem.Ŗ Ŕ notes Locke. (idem: 160) The fourth one is called by Locke 
argumentum ad judicium, employing Ŗthe using of proofs drawn from any of the 
foundations of knowledge or probabilityŗ (ibidem), the only arguments susceptible of 
producing progress in knowledge.  
Hamblin makes some important remarks about this fragment. First, one should 
notice that while Ŗargumentum ad verecundiamŗ, Ŗargumentum ad ignorantiamŗ and 
Ŗargumentum ad judiciumŗ are terms coined by Locke, hence not being used 
previously, about Ŗad hominemŗ Locke stipulates clearly that it is a term already in 
use. For explaining this fact, Hamblin refers to Latin translations of Aristotleřs 
Sophistical Refutations and to commentaries of various medieval logicians about this 
text (especially Albertus Magnus). With the same purpose, in a more recent article, 
Graciela Martha Chichi points to a logic handbook appeared twenty-one years before 
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Lockeřs Essay, namely Logica Hamburgensis, by Johannes Jungius, issued in 1638. 
(Chichi 2002: 333, 343)  
Secondly, we should notice that Locke doesnřt mention the term Ŗfallacyŗ and 
does not qualify any of these arguments as wrong or illegitimate. The only thing he 
mentions is that, as opposed to the other three, only argumentum ad judicium can 
lead to a progress in knowledge. Hamblin recognises a certain Aristotelian trait in 
Lockeřs remarks about ad hominem, emphasising the similarity with Aristotleřs 
dialectical arguments. Moreover, Hamblin points to places in Sophistical Refutations 
where Aristotle suggests, as a solution to specific fallacies based on division, to argue 
against the man, and not against the thesis as such (177b 33-35, 178b 20-25). Yet, 
the most significant fragment, to which the others should be related, is to be found in 
the fifteenth chapter, where Aristotle, discussing strategies used in sophistical 
refutations, claims: ŖMoreover, just as in rhetorical discourses, so also in those aimed 
at refutation, you should examine the discrepancies of the answererřs position either 
with his own statements, or with those of persons whom he admits to say and do 
aright, moreover with those of people who are generally supposed to bear that kind 
of character, or who are like them, or with those of the majority or of all men.ŗ(SR: 
174b) In fact, according to the standards of Aristotleřs dialectic, this type of 
argumentation based on revealing an inconsistency between the thesis advanced by 
a person and what was previously admitted in the dialectic game, or what is 
commonly accepted, is a legitimate argument, because both consistency and 
commitment to what is commonly accepted are guiding principles of Aristotleřs 
dialectic. To exemplify this type of argument, Walton mentions the case of stoic and 
epicurean philosophers, who were accused of not leading their life in accordance with 
the precepts of their philosophy. (Walton 2001: 213- 215) Philosophy, in those times, 
was concerned with answering the question Ŗhow to live a good life?ŗ and the 
biography of the philosopher was considered relevant for evaluating his philosophy: 
ŖThe problem would be that if the philosopher is not living up with his principles, 
then there are doubts raised about how sincere an advocate that philosopher is 
concerning his philosophy.ŗ (idem: 213) Walton quotes a relevant fragment from 
Polyaenus, a follower of Epicurus: ŖWhen the test of the actions is consistent with 
the solemnity of the theories, we may speak of the doctrine of a philosopher. But 
when the theory promises great things and the life accomplishes not the least bit, 
what else do we have but boasting and the showing off of a sophist who wishes to 
impress the young?ŗ (ibidem) Today we might classify these arguments as 
circumstantial ad hominem, without being necessarily fallacious. In those times, 
they were known under the name „tu quoqueŗ. Walton considers this specific 
example a sort of Ŗmeta-philosophical arguments that are quite legitimate, given the 
ancient view that a philosophy of virtue is not just an abstract theory, but is also 
meant to be a guide to how to live.ŗ(idem: 215) 
Having outlined the Hellenistic and Latin sense of ad hominem, the question 
raises naturally: how did the modern significance of ad hominem argument evolve? 
Hamblin shows that the key name in this evolution is that of Richard Whately, who 
would reassess the role of ad arguments [2] in practical argumentation, relating 
them to the crucial concepts of Ŗpresumptionŗ and Ŗburden of proofŗ. These terms, 
borrowed from judicial logic, are opposites: Ŗpresumptionŗ represents an accepted, 
uncontroversial position, to be taken for granted, while Ŗburden of proofŗ belongs to 
the part which contests the presumption. For winning the debate, the party which 
has the presumption on his side needs just to refute the arguments brought against 
him. Starting from here, Whately would subsume ad hominem arguments to the 
fallacies of relevance, because this argument tries to shift the burden of proof to the 
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opponent, while admitting, in a footnote, that this move is not always unjust. For 
Whately, argumentum ad hominem refers to that argument which points to 
particular circumstances, character, declared opinions, public or private behaviours, 
and which is valid only for that person, but not for the real problem, as in the case of 
ad rem arguments. The example that Hamblin selects from Whately is quite 
relevant: ŖWhen a sportsman is accused of barbarity in sacrificing hares or trout he 
may safely turn the table by replying Why do you feed on flesh of the harmless sheep 
and ox? (…) Such a conclusion is often both allowable and necessary to establish, in 
order to silence those who will not yield to fair general argument; or to convince 
those whose weakness and prejudices would not allow them to assign it its due 
weight (…) provided it be done plainly, and avowedly; (…) the fallaciousness depends 
upon the deceit, or attempt to deceive.ŗ (Whately, cited by Hamblin 1970: 174) 
Two short remarks are to be made about Whatelyřs approach: first, despite the 
broader definition of ad hominem arguments, which might indicate a shift towards 
the modern sense of this term, Whatelyřs example continues the tradition from 
Aristotle to Locke. And second, Whatelyřs comments are far more interesting than 
his example: ad hominem is only potentially fallacious, but might be as well used in 
a legitimate manner, against an opponent who himself is not a well-meaning person.  
Finally, Graciela Martha Chichi points to a last reference to the Aristotle-Locke 
tradition, which is to be found in Schopenhauerřs book The Art of Controversy 
(Eristiche Dialektik) where the Austrian philosopher talks about a trick which 
consists in ad hominem or ex concessis argumentation: ŖWhen your opponent makes 
a proposition, you must try to see whether it is not in some way Ŕ if needs be, only 
apparently Ŕ inconsistent with some other proposition which he has made or 
admitted, or with the principles of a school or sect which he has commended and 
approved, or with the actions of those who support the sect, or else of those who give 
it only an apparent and spurious support, or with his own actions or want of action. 
For example, should he defend suicide, you may at once exclaim, Why donřt you hang 
yourself? Should he maintain that Berlin is an unpleasant place to live in, you may 
say, Why donřt you leave by the first train? Such claptrap is always possible.ŗ 
(Schopenhauer, cited by Chichi 2002: 337-338). It is easy to see here the same 
Aristotelian tradition stemming from his Topics, disguised in Schopenhauerřs terms 
of Ŗconcession of a subjective, relative truthŗ as opposed to Ŗobjective, absolute truthŗ. 
But, more important, by his choice of words, Schopenhauer seems to be very aware 
that the acceptability of this type of argument is not obvious at all.  
In the same book, Schopenhauer provides us the roots of what is meant in 
modern logic by ad hominem argumentation: ŖA last trick is to become personal, 
insulting, rude, as soon as you perceive that your opponent has the upper hand, and 
that you are going to come off worst. It consists in passing from the subject of 
dispute, as from a lost game, to the disputant himself, and in some way attacking his 
person. It may be called the argumentum ad personam, to distinguish it from the 
argumentum ad hominem, which passes from the objective discussion of the subject 
pure and simple to the statements or admissions which your opponent has made in 
regard to it.ŗ (Schopenhauer, cited by Chichi 2002: 339) [3] 
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3. Modern approach of ad hominem arguments 
 
The tradition of classical logic conceived ad hominem argumentation as aiming at 
revealing an inconsistency between oneřs assumptions in an argument and oneřs 
explicit claims. Whately and Schopenhauer made a shift towards the modern 
understanding of these arguments. In a modern perspective, Ŗad hominem is 
committed when a case is argued not on its merits but by analysing (usually 
unfavourably) the motives or backgrounds of its supporters or opponents.ŗ (Hamblin 
1970: 41) Usually, two types are to be distinguished: abusive ad hominem and 
circumstantial ad hominem. The first category is equivalent of Schopenhauerřs ad 
personam, and Hamblin considers that these arguments could hardly be properly 
named arguments Ŕ consequently, there is no doubt that they are fallacies (and this 
last move might be hasty). Regarding the circumstantial ad hominem, there are in 
fact two distinct arguments hidden under this term: both the bias ad hominem 
(suggesting that a person defends a point of view not because he has indeed 
arguments for that point of view, but because he has a hidden interest in defending 
it) and the one coming from Aristotle Ŕ Locke tradition. In both cases it is not very 
clear if these arguments are fallacies, or they might be accepted in argumentation. A 
good example for the bias ad hominem might be found in the next dialogue:  
A: In my view, it is highly questionable whether smoking really causes cancer; there are 
studies which deny it.  
B: Do you want me to accept that opinion from you? Everyone knows your research is 
sponsored by the tobacco industry. 
(van Eemeren, Meuffels, Verburg, 2000: 427) 
In this case, B suggests that, since Ařs research is financially supported by the 
tobacco industry, A has an interest in defending this point of view, in order to keep 
the advantages thus gained. Whatřs interesting about this case is that no matter 
what exactly the object of Ařs research is (be that the relation between smoking and 
cancer, or the market share of a certain tobacco company), Břs argument bears the 
same weight, which remains to be evaluated. 
A classical example of the second case of circumstantial ad hominem is:  
The parent argues to the child that he should not smoke, because smoke is unhealthy. The 
child replies: what about you? You smoke! So much for you argument against smoking. 
(Walton 2000a: 182)  
The child correctly notices the pragmatic inconsistency of his father, which 
diminishes his credibility as a spokesperson for an antismoker position, but on the 
other hand rejects a quite reasonable argument without any counter-argument. This 
example is typically labelled tu quoque. 
The pragma-dialectical approach defines the ad hominem argument as a 
manoeuvre through which the opponent is attacked in an attempt to disqualify him 
as a serious participant in a critical discussion. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 
reduce all ad hominem arguments to three major forms: a) the attempt to silence the 
opponent by Ŗcasting doubt on his expertise, intelligence, character or good faithŗ 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 111) is qualified as abusive ad-hominem (or 
direct personal attack); b) the attempt to depict oneřs motives for adopting a certain 
point of view as suspect or unreliable is qualified as circumstantial ad hominem (or 
indirect personal attack); one might argue that the opponent has a bias in defending 
or advancing doubts on a standpoint, his credibility thus being diminished; c) the 
attempt to find an inconsistency in oneřs opponentřs expressed or unexpressed 
commitments, or between these commitments and his previous deeds, is qualified as 
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tu quoque ad hominem, which occurs, typically, Ŗwhen someone casts doubt on a 
standpoint of which he himself is an adherentŗ. (ibidem)  
Conceived in this manner, ad hominem argumentation is, generally, a violation 
of an implicit rule of a critical discussion: parties must not prevent each other from 
advancing standpoints or casting doubts on standpoints (first rule of the pragma-
dialectical approach). This rule governs the confrontation stage of the critical 
discussion. There are, yet, some shortcomings of this approach. First, it is not always 
the case that ad hominem argumentation occurs in the confrontation stage of the 
critical discussion, the fragment from Schopenhauer quoted above suggesting that it 
may be employed at any step of the argumentative process. Second, the more general 
claim of the pragma-dialectical theory, that argumentation is to be conceived as a 
critical discussion, can be too restrictive; for instance, Douglas Walton identifies six 
types of dialogue in which argumentation might occur, and the fallacious aspect of 
argumentation is to be evaluated having in mind the aim of each type (see Walton 
1995: 98-130). [4] Third, and coming to a more specific criticism, reducing the 
circumstantial ad-hominem to the bias-type might seem both too narrow and against 
common intuitions arising from the historical tradition of this argument. Fourth, 
subsuming any type of inconsistency to the tu quoque label seems an ad hoc move, 
especially since we have to distinguish between the mere proof of a person being 
inconsistent in his commitments, that being a reason for not accepting his position, 
and the more complex situation when the allegation of inconsistency is a proof of 
hypocrisy (or other negative character traits) and thus discrediting that person as a 
serious partner in a critical discussion. In the first case we continue the Aristotle Ŕ 
Locke tradition, in the second case we are talking about the modern meaning of ad 
hominem. 
Douglas Walton, following a pragmatic approach, defines ad hominem 
argumentation as Ŗthe use of personal attack in a dialogue exchange between two 
parties, where one party attacks the character of the other party as bad, in some 
respects, and then uses this attack as a basis for criticising the otherřs party 
argumentŗ. (Walton 2000b: 102) Walton uses the term ethotic arguments as a 
synonym of ad hominem, referring to Aristotleřs Rhetoric, where three types of proofs 
are described: those based on logos (logical proof, either real or apparent), ethos 
(moral authority of the character of the speaker) and pathos (a certain emotional 
disposition of the audience). (Aristotle Rhet.: 1356a) In this context, ad hominem 
argumentation is an argument directed against the moral authority of the speaker. 
The key element in Waltonřs approach is, consequently, this intermediary step where 
the ethos of the opponent is attacked, thus making a clear difference between ad 
hominem argumentation and mere pragmatic inconsistency (or argument from 
commitment, as Walton labels it). But this is exactly the difference between the 
modern sense of circumstantial ad hominem and Aristotleřs sense. More clearly, 
Walton excludes from the sphere of ad hominem argumentation exactly the 
Aristotelian view, and this would be wrong: the Greek philosopher does not mention 
anywhere in his Sophistical Refutations that the argument directed against the 
questioner is aimed at attacking his credibility, but the aim is to find a solution to an 
apparent refutation. We shall return to this matter later. 
Douglas Walton distinguishes between four major types of ad hominem 
arguments [5]: 
I. Direct attack (or abusive ad hominem) Ŕ In this type of argument, the attacker 
claims that his opponent is a person of bad character, so, his argument should not be 
accepted. The scheme of the argument is the following (where X stands for a person, 
a stands for an argument and A stands for a proposition): 
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1. X advocates argument a, which has proposition A as its conclusion; 
2. X is a person of bad (defective) character;  
3. So, Xřs argument a should not be accepted. 
This schematisation emphasises the question of character. But, instead of 
character, an intellectual trait might also be involved: we might say not only that X 
is misogynist or aggressive or a liar, but also that he is uninformed or incompetent.  
II. Circumstantial ad hominem Ŕ Walton considers that this type is always based 
on an allegation of inconsistency, used to accuse the character of the opponent as a 
justification for rejecting the thesis. The scheme of the argument might be:  
1. X advocates argument a, which has proposition A as its conclusion; 
2. X carried out a set of actions that implies that X is committed to nonA; 
3. Therefore X is a bad person; 
4. So, Xřs argument a should not be accepted. 
Conclusion 3, generated from premise 2, might be particularised by appeal to 
morally bad traits of character like hypocrisy, insincerity or applying double 
standards (a common denominator might be you donřt practice what you preach). 
This type of argument is not the same as tu quoque from the pragma-dialectical 
approach: in the tu quoque type, the intermediate conclusion 3 might be 
unnecessary. For instance, in Schopenhauerřs example, when the defender of the 
suicide is asked Why donřt you hang yourself? the hidden argument beyond this 
question could probably be reconstructed like this: since you pretend yourself to be a 
defender of the suicide and yet you havenřt committed suicide so far, it means that 
you are not very serious in what you claim about suicide, so your arguments are also 
not to be taken seriously. The problem with this type of argument is that the third 
step is usually unexpressed, and it is not easy every time to account for its presence 
when reconstructing the argument. A good example in this regard is the next 
fragment of a conversation between Frederick W. de Clerk, president of South Africa 
in 1990, and a journalist who asked him if he had supported the doctrine of 
apartheid: 
Iřve been in Parliament for 17 years, and I have never defended the concept of apartheid. 
A response: But you were a prominent member of, and high office holder in, the 
Nationalist Party Ŕ the Party that developed and implemented the policy of apartheid! 
(de Wijze 2003: 39) 
It is implicit in the journalistřs argument that one couldnřt hold a high position in the 
Nationalist Party without being committed to the official doctrine of the party, which 
was the apartheid doctrine. Yet, we donřt have compelling reasons to claim that an 
accusation of lie was implicit in the journalistřs argument. A sceptic might say that 
we donřt even have here an ad hominem argumentation: de Clerk claims that he was 
a member of the Nationalist Party but he was not a supporter of the apartheid 
politics, while the journalist claims that it was not possible to be a member of the 
Nationalist Party and yet not to be a supporter of apartheid doctrine. Douglas 
Walton would consider this argument as an argument from commitment, not an ad 
hominem, and the general form of this argument might be: 
1. X is committed to proposition A (based on what he did or declared in the 
past); 
2. So, in this case, X should support A. 
A typical example for an argument from commitment might be identified in the 
following conversation:  
Bob: Ed, you are a communist, arenřt you? 
Ed: Of course, you know that. 
Bob: Well, then you should be on the side of the union in this recent labour dispute. 
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(Walton 2000a: 185) 
Analysing these two last examples, we can see that de Clerkřs case is just the 
reverse of the medal in an argument from commitment. On the other hand, if Bobřs 
last line would have been: ŖWell, then you should be on the side of the union in this 
recent labour dispute. But you are on the side of the employers Ŕ donřt you think you 
are contradicting yourself?ŗ then we might have had an Aristotelian case of ad 
hominem. So, Waltonřs approach to ad hominem argumentation leaves aside a very 
important type of this argument.  
III. bias ad hominem Ŕ It represents the argument that van Eemeren and 
Grootendorst have labelled as circumstantial ad hominem. The general form of this 
argument might be: 
1. Person X, the proponent of argument a, is biased. 
2. Person Xřs bias is a failure to take part honestly in a dialogue in which he is 
a part.  
3. Therefore X is a bad person. 
4. Therefore X should not be given as much credibility as it would have 
without the bias.  
What seems surprising in the conclusion of this argument is that it is no longer 
the acceptability which is contested in this last statement, but Xřs credibility. But 
the very essence of ad hominem argumentation consists in attacking the credibility 
of a person with the aim of rejecting the argument advanced by that person. 
Moreover, the step from the second premise to the third one is problematic: we could 
expect that X might be considered dishonest, sleight or devious, and the fallacious 
character of the argumentation rests on the presupposition that a person who has an 
interest in supporting a point of view cannot take part honestly in a debate on that 
point of view. But the step from 2 to 3 cannot be made every time, and there are 
situations when X might declare frankly that he has a personal motive for adopting 
A, but he asks his collocutors to ignore this fact and to evaluate the arguments he 
advances just by themselves. I consider that a better reconstruction of this type of 
argument might be the following:  
1. Person X, the proponent of argument a, is biased. 
2. Person Xřs bias is a failure to take part honestly in a dialogue in which he is 
a part.  
3. Therefore X should not be given as much credibility as it would have 
without the bias.  
4. Therefore Xřs argument A should not be accepted. 
By this schematisation we turn back to the common intuition that ad hominem 
argumentation refers to the rejection of an argument by criticising not the argument, 
but the person who advances it.  
IV. Poisoning the well ad hominem Ŕ In this type of attack the proponent is 
accusing the opponent that he is rigidly and dogmatically committed to a position, so 
that he would never be able just to evaluate an argument on its merits, but he would 
always try to force the acceptance of his position. A classic example mentioned by 
Walton is that of the Cardinal Newmanřs position against abortion. He was accused 
that as a Catholic, he always reverted to the Catholic position on any political 
dispute on any subject, and therefore could never be trusted. The fallacious 
character of this argument is subtly revealed by Cardinal Newmanřs answer:  
such an attack, if taken seriously, meant that he, as a practicing Catholic, could never take 
part in any political debate, on any issue, with any credibility. 
(Walton 2000a: 184).  
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This type of argument is based on a publicly declared commitment of the arguer, 
or on a social role. Following this strategy, any public figure can be discredited 
because of his commitment to a religious or political orientation which prevents him 
from having an open attitude in a debate. It is obvious that this type of argument is 
a generalised form of bias ad hominem, yet with slight resemblances of 
circumstantial ad hominem. Waltonřs general description of this argument is the 
following:  
1. For every argument a in a dialogue, X is biased. 
2. Xřs bias is a failure to take part honestly in a type of dialogue that X is part 
of. 
3. Therefore X is a bad person. 
4. Therefore X should not be given as much credibility as it would have 
without the bias. 
Since Waltonřs analysis of the poisoning the well ad hominem follows the 
previous analysis of bias ad hominem, the same remarks I advanced there are also 
valid here.  
 
 
4. Ethos and evaluation of ad hominem arguments: when are they acceptable 
in discourse?  
 
Waltonřs idea to connect ad hominem argumentation with Aristotleřs concept of ethos 
sheds new light on the debate around this type of argumentation. Yet, Walton is 
more interested in the concept of character as developed by Aristotle in his 
Nicomachean Ethics and less in his Rhetoric [6]. More than that, he seems to ignores 
the wider tradition of this term in Greek and Roman rhetoric.  
Canonical studies in the history of rhetoric distinguish between a Greek tradition 
of ethos as a persuasive appeal and its Roman counterpart. Aristotleřs references to 
ethos in his Rhetoric are scarce and not always very clear. Usually the following 
fragment is quoted: ŖThe orator persuades by moral character when his speech is 
delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence; for we feel 
confidence in a greater degree and more readily in persons of worth in regard to 
everything in general, but where there is no certainty and there is room for doubt, 
our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must be due to the speech itself, not 
to any preconceived idea of the speaker's character.ŗ (Aristotle Rhet: 1356a 5-10). In 
Aristotleřs view, ethos is the most effective proof in topics where certainty is not 
possible, but ethos has to be created through discourse Ŕ so Aristotleřs concept does 
not point to a reputation pre-existent to the speech, but to a credibility which is 
continuously created through speech, and Aristotle puts it clearly: credibility 
consists in proving yourself through your speech as having prudence, good will and 
virtue. (Aristotle Rhet: 1378a 5-10). So, to put it briefly, for Aristotle, ethos is an 
image of the orator, created through his discourse.  
From Isocrates, Aristotleřs contemporary, stems a different tradition of 
conceiving ethos: as a previous reputation that the orator had in a particular 
audience. This manner of conceiving ethos became dominant in Roman Rhetoric, as 
is the case with Cicero, and extended so widely as to cover the whole family of the 
orator: ŖCharacter in this sense can be passed from one generation to another; 
Romans respected the customs of the ancestors (mos maiorum) and revered 
authorityŗ. (Olmsted 2006: 30) 
The concept of ethos was seriously contested by the Cartesian tradition and 
especially by the Enlightenment, Millřs On liberty being a typical example. Yet, this 
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concept revived in various disciplines studying language, such as stylistics, 
pragmatics, discourse analysis or conversation analysis (Amossy 2000: 68-69). 
Accounting for ethos, in this view, would amount to studying all the means by which 
a self-image is interactively created through discourse in a certain context.  
Summing up both insights from classical rhetoric and contemporary interests 
coming from discourse analysis, we can distinguish four sources of ethos as an image 
of the speaker, supposed to give credibility to the discourse. On the one hand, we 
should have in mind the distinction between what the speaker expresses directly 
about him in front of his audience (not just using the first person, but also through 
gesture, tone of voice, clothing) and what is implicit (what the audience already 
knows about the speaker or can infer from the speech). On the other hand, we have 
to distinguish between extradiscursive ethos (contextual information about the 
speaker) and intradiscursive ethos (an image of the speaker created through 
discourse).  
 
ETHOS Expressed Implicit 
Extradiscursive 1 
Corporality 
Gesture and posture 
Tone of voice 
2 
Reputation: 
previous knowledge of the 
audience about the speaker 
Discursive 3 
Statements about oneřs own person or 
deeds: 
self-presentation, self-criticism, self-praise 
4 
Rhetorical persona: 
built through arguments, 
style, expression of emotions 
 
Table 1: Sources of ethos 
 
Hence, there are four sources of ethos: the first one is generated by the mere 
presence of the speaker (either directly or mediated) and consists in non-verbal and 
para-verbal behaviour, physical traits, outfit, other factors that might evoke a 
physical presence; the second source consists in the reputation of the speaker Ŕ 
based on his position in government or in society, previous actions, popularity etc. 
(the equivalent of the Roman view about ethos) but also expressed commitments in 
previous speeches or through previous actions, known by the audience; the third 
source consists in explicit or implicit self-describing statements: these statements 
may be intended to reinforce, to change or to build the speakerřs reputation; they 
might be direct self-praise or narratives from which the audience could infer the 
character of the speaker; and the fourth source of ethos is the rhetorical persona 
(roughly the equivalent of authorial persona in literary criticism or the equivalent of 
Aristotleřs ethos): by providing arguments, the speaker might inspire prudence, by 
making concessions he might prove himself benevolent, by committing himself to 
moral maxims he might prove his virtues; yet, not only arguments build the 
rhetorical persona, but also the style (for instance, by choosing between various 
semantic registers, the speaker might increase or diminish the distance between him 
and his audience, thus creating an image of a friendly person or a distant Ŗexpertŗ) 
or the use of emotional appeal not just to influence the audience, but also to create a 
certain image about oneself Ŕ for instance Ŗrenaissance interprets the oratorřs feeling 
emotion himself as a sign of authenticityŗ. (Olmsted 2006: 31) 
This systematisation of the sources of ethos has several theoretical advantages: 
for the purpose of this paper, it indicates Ŗtopics of inventionŗ for ad hominem 
arguments Ŕ more exactly, where to find inconsistencies exploitable in ad hominem 
attacks. More generally, it suggests that the speakerřs credibility might be based on 
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the coherence of all these elements building ethos, and this hypothesis is susceptible 
of empirical verification. We can turn now to Waltonřs typology of ad hominem 
arguments and reshape it according both to these observations about ethos and to 
previously expressed criticism: 
I. Ex concessis ad hominem (Aristotle Ŕ Locke tradition): 
1. X advocates argument a, which has proposition A as its conclusion. 
2. X carried out a set of actions that implies that X is committed to nonA. 
3. So X cannot advance a coherent position regarding A. 
4. So Xřs argument a should not be accepted. 
II. Direct ad hominem, or abusive ad hominem, or argumentum ad personam: 
1. X advocates argument a, which has proposition A as its conclusion. 
2. X is a person of bad (defective) character; (premise usually based on the 
second source of ethos). 
3. So, Xřs argument a should not be accepted. 
III. Indirect ad hominem, or circumstantial ad hominem, or tu quoque:  
1. X advocates argument a, which has proposition A as its conclusion. 
2. X carried out a set of actions that implies that X is committed to nonA. 
3. So X cannot advance a coherent position regarding A. 
4. So X is a person of bad (defective) character (inferred directly or through 
intermediary steps from 3). 
5. So, Xřs argument a should not be accepted.  
IV. Bias ad hominem: 
1. Person X, the proponent of argument a, is biased; (premise based on the 
second source of ethos). 
2. Person Xřs bias is a failure to take part honestly in a dialogue in which he is 
a part.  
3. Therefore X should not be given the credibility he would have without the 
bias.  
4. Therefore Xřs argument a should not be accepted. 
V. Poisoning the well ad hominem: 
1. X advocates argument a, which has proposition A as its conclusion; 
2. X is committed to a group or a doctrine which supports A; (premise based 
on the second source of ethos). 
3. Therefore X should not be given the credibility he would have without this 
commitment. 
4. Therefore Xřs argument a should not be accepted. 
It is clear from this typology, an amended version of Douglas Waltonřs view, that 
the major difference between Aristotleřs tradition regarding ad hominem arguments 
and the modern circumstantial ad hominem lies in the way the accusation of 
inconsistency is used. The historical account about theorisation of ad hominem 
argumentation aimed not only at explaining the terminological diversity of this type 
of argument, but also at providing a base for my systematisation. In the first type of 
argument, this accusation represents a sufficient reason for rejecting Xřs argument, 
while in the third type this accusation is taken as a ground for revealing a deficiency 
in Xřs character. Moreover, all arguments except the first one are ethotic arguments, 
so the value of these arguments is to be assessed relative to those situations where 
ethos plays an important role. We have already seen that Aristotle considered ethos 
the most effective persuasive appeal in those situations where certainty is not 
possible Ŕ i.e. deliberative rhetoric. And if so, it means that ad hominem arguments 
might not be always fallacious, as the standard treatment of fallacies considers 
them.  
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The first to seriously investigate the nature of ad hominem arguments and to 
refute their fallacious nature was Henry W. Johnstone Jr, in 1952. Starting from the 
use of pragmatic inconsistencies in philosophical argumentation [7], Johnstone 
would get to the bewildering claim that all genuine philosophical argumentation is 
ad hominem argumentation. His backing for this radical claim resides in the 
distinction borrowed from Whately between ad hominem and ad rem. But, since in 
philosophy, argumentation ad rem is not possible because philosophy is the most 
general field of knowledge, the only desideratum of philosophy, as well as the first 
principle of polemic, concerns self-referentiality. And the attack against a certain 
philosophy would amount to showing that it doesnřt meet its own standards, thus 
proving that its own principles are unintelligible. Hence, ad hominem argumentation 
is not only valid in philosophy, but is the most genuine argumentative strategy for 
this field.  
While recognising Johnstoneřs merits in triggering debates which would finally 
lead to disambiguating the complex concept of ad hominem argumentation, Douglas 
Walton points that Johnstoneřs thesis Ŗmakes sense when one defines the 
argumentum ad hominem in Lockean fashion, as argumentation from other partyřs 
commitment (…) in a Lockean sense philosophy is a kind of argumentum ad 
hominem.ŗ (Walton 1998: 40) But this type of argument is valid by itself, although it 
might be used in a fallacious manner. 
When evaluating ethotic ad hominem arguments, Douglas Walton admits that 
even these arguments are neither fallacious nor non-fallacious per se. Ad hominem 
arguments might be just insufficiently supported arguments (weak arguments) or 
even reasonable arguments in certain contexts. So, in evaluating ad hominem 
arguments one should pay special attention to the type of dialogue these arguments 
are employed in (persuasion, inquiry, negotiation, information seeking, deliberation 
or eristic), to the specific type of ad hominem argument used, and to the topic of the 
dialogue (political, ethical, scientific, domestic etc). Once these established, the 
evaluation proceeds through critical questions. For instance, for the abusive type of 
ad hominem, these would be the relevant critical questions: 
1. How well supported is the premise that X is a person of bad character? 
2. Is the issue of character relevant in the type of dialogue in which the argument 
was used? 
3. Is the conclusion of the argument that a should be (absolutely) rejected even if 
other evidence to support a has been presented, or is the conclusion merely (the 
relative claim) that a should be assigned a reduced weight of credibility, relative to 
the total body of evidence available? (see Walton 1998: 250) 
Evaluation of arguments through critical questions requires a well trained mind, 
able to adapt general principles to particular contexts. It is not a mechanical 
procedure (like some used in formal logic) and by no means can an exhaustive list of 
critical questions be learned by heart.  
Yet, in which situations are ad hominem arguments to be accepted in a 
confrontation? Given Waltonřs emphasis on their ethotic character, they might be 
reasonable when credibility of the agent is as important as the critical discussion he 
is engaged in. The most obvious case is that of the witness in a trial. Moreover, it is 
also the case wherever deliberative choice or practical reasoning are involved, such 
as in politics, because the character of the politician might represent, for instance, a 
guarantee that promises would be kept. Finally, since any successful argumentative 
interaction presupposes some traits and commitments of the participants (open-
mindedness, sincerity, the will to get to a solution, even politeness), appealing to 
direct ad hominem attacks (but in a polite manner) might result in getting a derailed 
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dialogue back on its track, or at least in a motivated retreat from a dialogue which 
could lead nowhere. 
 
 
5. Legitimacy and ad hominem argumentation 
 
Teun A. van Dijk remarked that although the problem of legitimation has generated 
a huge literature in political philosophy, Ŗin discourse analysis it is much less 
studied than, say, politeness or persuasion, although legitimation is a prominent 
function of language use and discourseŗ (van Dijk 1998: 255). According to van Dijk, 
legitimation is the institutional equivalent of justification in everyday informal talk 
and it has an interactional dimension, being a discursive response to a real or 
anticipated challenge of oneřs legitimacy. Pragmatically, legitimation is related to 
the speech act of defending oneself, Ŗbut itřs not an illocutionary act at all, but (like 
argumentation and storytelling) a more broadly defined communicative act that 
usually requires more than the utterance of one single proposition. Legitimation may 
be a complex, ongoing discursive practice involving a set of interrelated discourses.ŗ 
(ibidem) As legitimation is closely related to norms and values shared or contested 
between competing social groups, van Dijk connects legitimation with ideologies, and 
since ideologies are usually in competition through discourse and want to gain 
hegemony in the public space, it becomes clear why one cannot speak about 
legitimation without speaking about delegitimation: Ŗlegitimation is a complex social 
act that is typically exercised by talk and text. Strategies of legitimation and 
delegitimation are similarly discursive, and involve the usual moves of positive self-
presentation and negative other-presentationŗ (idem: 260). Usual objects of 
legitimation or delegitimation might be: membership to a group, actions of that 
group, its goals, its norms and values, social position or access to social resources for 
members of a certain group. A special object of legitimation or delegitimation, 
considers Van Dijk, is the discourse itself. Usually, delegitimation of the discourse 
itself employs Ŗstrategies focused on the context of production, on access and use of 
discourse, for example by challenging the legitimacy of communication participants 
(who has the right to speak, or to speak for others?), speaker roles, setting, goals, 
knowledge, expertise, and so on.ŗ (ibidem) In the last few lines we can already 
recognise various ways of violating the first rule of the pragma-dialectical model of 
argumentation. 
In a recent article, Theo van Leeuwen has outlined a descriptive framework for 
analysing the manners in which language can be used to legitimise or critique. He 
distinguishes four major categories of legitimation: 
1. Authorisation: legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom 
and law, and of persons in whom institutional authority of some kind is vested. 
2. Moral evaluation: legitimation by direct or implicit reference to value systems. 
3. Rationalisation: legitimation by reference to the goals and uses of 
institutionalised social action and to the knowledge society has constructed to endow 
them with cognitive validity. 
4. Mythopoiesis: legitimation conveyed through narratives whose outcomes 
reward legitimate actions and punish non-legitimate actions. (van Leeuwen 2007: 
92) 
As Van Leeuwen puts it, Ŗin contemporary discourse, moralisation and 
rationalisation keep each other at armřs lengths.ŗ (idem: 100) In fact, modern 
bureaucracies tend to be characterised by rational and authoritative legitimation, 
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while in premodern societies legitimation was mainly based on moral evaluation and 
mythopoiesis.  
It becomes apparent now that ad hominem argumentation is a frequently used 
strategy for delegitimation, more specifically moral delegitimation, at least as long 
as a link between the person attacked and the institutional context is provided. Yet, 
discourse analysis being a descriptive (or at best critical) study of language use, 
systematisations thus provided canřt go much further regarding the rational 
acceptability of the (de-)legitimation strategies used in public communication. So, 
theories like pragma-dialectics and informal logic, which claim to approach 
argumentation both from a descriptive and a normative perspective, can push the 
analysis further, offering a way to answer the problem of acceptability by appealing 
to certain standards of reasonability. In the following analysis I will reconstruct the 
arguments from the excerpts presented in the second part of this paper and try to 
systematically relate the use of ad hominem arguments with discursive strategies. 
Cristoiuřs complex argument might be reconstructed as follows:  
The act of condemning communism is immoral because: 
a. Traian Băsescu, the person condemning communism, is not the most entitled 
to do it, since he was one of the privileged of this regime (implicitly a collaborator of 
this regime, so a communist); 
b. communism was condemned on the grounds that it was a criminal regime, but 
a striking counter-example to this claim is exactly the person who condemned 
communism, because Traian Băsescu made an exquisite career during communism, 
based only on his merits, which (implicit assumption) would not be possible in a 
criminal regime; 
c. there might be also an implicit argument, masked by the mark of concession 
Letřs admit it (which means that the concession is only provisional): if Traian 
Băsescu is not sincere in his justification, it means that both his career and his 
wealth during communism are due to his privileged collaboration with the 
communist regime, which again does not entitle him to condemn communism. 
Both the first and the third argument contain a hidden tu quoque ad hominem: 
1. Traian Băsescu claims that the communist regime in Romania was illegitimate 
and criminal, so he claims that this regime should be condemned for those reasons.  
2. Traian Băsescu was a privileged person in the communist regime, a fact 
impossible without him being a supporter and collaborator of the Communist Party. 
3. So, based on his past, Traian Băsescu cannot advance a coherent position 
regarding the condemnation of communism. 
4. So, Traian Băsescu is not the most entitled person to condemn communism. 
5. So, condemnation of communism by Traian Băsescu is immoral.  
Thus reconstructed, the argument does not fit exactly into the proposed scheme, 
yet the ad hominem character of this argument is obvious: the accusations you donřt 
practice what you preach stems from the second premise. The third premise, left 
implicit in the argument, is based on the ungrounded assumption that once 
committed to communism, Traian Băsescu could not sincerely and entirely abandon 
this commitment, and this assumption breaks an implicit presumption of sincerity 
(the equivalent of the legal presumption of innocence in Griceřs terms of maxim of 
quality). Yet, the argument would stand even without this premise. The jump from 
premise 2 to premise 4 might be reasonable: indeed, a person who suffered political 
oppression during communism would have had much more credibility when 
condemning communism. The real problem with Cristoiuřs argument is the jump 
from 4 to 5: from the mere fact that Traian Băsescu is not the most entitled person to 
condemn communism, it does not follow that condemnation of communism by Traian 
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Băsescu is immoral. The assumption on which this hasty argumentative jump rests 
Ŕ the condemnation of the communism would not be immoral only if it were 
performed by the most entitled person Ŕ is certainly unacceptable. 
So, Cristoiuřs text is based on ad hominem argumentation, but the argument is 
not fallacious (or at least not in this regard); instead, the argument is very poorly 
supported in its final stage: it is a weak argument but it is not fallacious. Evaluating 
this text from the legitimation perspective, it represents a delegitimation attempt, 
based on moral evaluation in van Leeuwenřs terms. But the moral evaluation 
appears in the conclusion of the argument and the argument fails in supporting this 
conclusion. The objects of delegitimation in Cristoiuřs text were the goal of the action 
(further in his editorial Cristoiu asserts that Traian Băsescuřs real purpose was to 
settle accounts with his political enemies) and the discourse itself, contesting the 
legitimacy of Traian Băsescu to perform the speech act (Traian Băsescu is not 
entitled to condemn communism).  
As noted before, the article in Cotidianul might be conceived as a reply to 
Cristoiuřs argument, trying to legitimate Traian Băsescuřs speech by a reverse moral 
evaluation: the condemnation of communism is good, even if it were Ceauşescu the 
one to carry it out. Here the ad hominem argumentation is just suggested by means 
of a dialogue through Yahoo Messenger, and the argument is advanced in an indirect 
manner, only to be withdrawn later. Ancařs initial argument is difficult to 
reconstruct, due to its elliptic expression, so I will try a maximal reconstruction [8] of 
this argument: 
1. Traian Băsescu is not young enough to not have been involved in politics 
before 1989; 
2. The act of condemning communism would have had more credibility if it were 
accomplished by someone young enough not to have been involved in politics before 
1989; 
3. So Traian Băsescu, assuming the responsibility of condemning communism, 
discredited the act of condemning communism;  
4. So Traian Băsescuřs initiative is not OK (is immoral). 
Although thus reconstructed the argument seems quite strong, it is not accepted 
by the antagonist, who forces the acceptance of his point of view by mere reiteration 
of his standpoint and by indirectly warning that unexpressed premises in Ancařs 
argument are irrelevant to this debate: even if it came from Ceauşescu, it would still 
be good; Ancařs reaction to this aggressive advance seems a compromise between 
accepting her initial ad hominem argument and accepting Costinřs standpoint, 
transforming the counter-argument in a pro-argument: one needs a thief to recognize 
a thief (and a communist to recognize and condemn the crimes of communism, we 
might add). In fact, there is an interesting shift in legitimation strategies used by 
Anca: from a delegitimation strategy based on moral evaluation to a legitimation 
strategy based on rationalization (the choice of the appropriate means to a certain 
end, in a certain context).  
Finally, the fragment selected from Cristian Tudor Popescuřs editorial is an 
explicit answer to Cristoiuřs argument. Here a strict distinction between the 
question of legitimacy and the question of character is operated. Traian Băsescu has 
condemned communism as president of Romania and hence the legitimacy of 
authorisation is sufficient for gaining loyalty to this decision. Yet a lot of negative 
statements about Traian Băsescu are advanced in this article, and one might 
recognize here the typical arsenal used in ad hominem argumentation: Traian 
Băsescu lacks familiarity with the things he condemned (direct ad hominem), Traian 
Băsescu is not in fact committed to his statements (circumstantial ad hominem), 
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Traian Băsescu is aggressive and impolite etc. Ŕ although they are not used to reject 
a standpoint advanced by Traian Băsescu. At this point a more general question 
arises: how can an institution gain legitimacy if the person who represents it is 
delegitimised by the same discourse that legitimises the institution? One might be 
tempted here to warn that we can talk about legitimacy only in institutional 
contexts, not about persons. Here the concept of ethos provides the necessary link: 
since ethos has a reputational dimension and occupying a public office requires 
certain virtues, the person occupying that office can be delegitimised. Where 
character is relevant for the topic of the debate, like in politics, credibility and 
legitimacy can substitute each other and can interact. So, Cristian Tudor Popescuřs 
argument might backfire: the authority of the highest position in the state might 
lose its legitimacy as long as the person occupying it loses credibility constantly.  
 
 
Final remarks 
 
To sum up, the hidden issue in the debate about condemnation of communism is one 
concerning a supposed credibility of the condemner: in order to be successful (i.e. 
sincere and moral), the condemnation of communism should be undertaken by 
someone who has (merely) the institutional authority to do it, or by someone who is 
both in the institutional and the moral position of doing it? Is the credibility of the 
condemner only a supervenient condition, or a necessary one? If we assume the first 
answer, then any recourse to ad hominem argumentation is fallacious Ŕ and this is 
the position adopted by Cristian Tudor Popescu; if we assume the second answer, to 
which Ion Cristoiu seems to be committed, then there are opportunities for 
legitimate use of ad hominem argumentation, but Cristoiu fails to build his case 
cogently. From a critical discourse analysis perspective, the debate about 
condemnation of communism is a clash between different types of legitimation: 
Cristian Tudor Popescu supports this act through authority legitimation, while Ion 
Cristoiu contests it through moral delegitimation, by appeal to ad hominem 
argumentation. More generally, from a descriptive point of view, ad hominem 
argumentation can be an instrument for contesting legitimacy. Yet, normative  
insights from argumentation theory can go beyond the descriptive limits of critical 
discourse analysis, raising the question about the appropriateness of legitimation 
strategies used in public debates Ŕ for instance, in the case of condemnation of 
communism, the appropriateness of moral delegitimation by means of ad hominem 
arguments. 
Ad hominem argumentation can be more than just a deceitful argumentative 
device which blocks the process of argumentation, as it is described in the pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentation. In certain contexts it might be a reasonable 
course of argumentation, and is a frequently used strategy for legitimation and 
delegitimation. Although modern bureaucracies are characterised by rational and 
authoritative legitimation (specific to modern societies, as opposed to archaic 
societies where legitimation is mainly based on moral evaluation and mythopoiesis), 
yet the practical reasoning involved in politics and deliberation leads us back to the 
concept of ethos. Conceiving ethos rather in a rhetorical manner than in an ethical 
one, it is possible to account for those situations when credibility and legitimation 
substitute each other and ad hominem argumentation might have effect not only on 
persons, but also on institutions.  
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Notes 
 
[1] The English equivalent idiom of this Romanian proverb is the pot calling the kettle black. In 
the Romanian culture, there is also a reverse proverb for this one: do what the priest preaches, 
not what he does. Proverbs tend to function similarly to the topics of invention in classical 
rhetoric Ŕ they provide general patterns or starting points in argumentation. In fact, one could 
conceive paremiology not just as a collection of popular wisdom, but also as a repertoire of 
rhetorical topics of invention specific to each culture (for a distinction between dialectical topics 
and rhetorical topics, see Keinpointner 1997: 228) 
[2] Ad arguments is an abbreviated phrase employed by Hamblin to refer to all arguments with 
Latin names which are not to be found in Aristotleřs Sophistical Refutations. 
[3] There are commentators of Aristotle who suggests that the origin of this argument is to be 
found in Aristotle too, in his Topics, book VIII § 11, 161: ŖAccordingly it sometimes becomes 
necessary to attack the speaker and not his position, when the answerer lies in wait for the 
points that are contrary to the questioner and becomes abusive as well: when people lose their 
tempers in this way, their argument becomes a contest, not a discussion.ŗ Yet it is not very 
clear in Aristotleřs text what Ŗattack the speaker and not his positionŗ actually means, nor is 
there much consensus between commentators on this fragment. (Chichi 2002: 335) 
[4] It is beyond our aim in this paper to present and evaluate Waltonřs critique of the pragma-
dialectical approach to argumentation.  
[5] This presentation reconstructs and synthesises Waltonřs typology, elaborated in Walton 
1998, 2000a, 2000 b, 2001. 
[6] Yet he provides a thorough analysis of the relation between character and deliberation in 
Walton 1998: 200-203. 
[7] Or pragmatic paradoxes; Johnstone defines a pragmatic paradox as Ŗa proposition whose 
credibility is undercut by the act of uttering itŗ (Johnstone 1952: 491), like in the common 
example I never use correct English. A similar example from philosophical argumentation, 
provided by Johnstone is: The naturalist considers the statement All knowledge is merely the 
function of the adjustments if the organism to its environment. But now the naturalist must 
assume that his own account of nature is true, and since his own statement represents 
knowledge, it means that his own statement is Ŗmerely the function of the adjustments if his 
organism to its environmentŗ, meaning that his own statement has no more significance than 
any other adjustment of the organism, so I do not have to assume this statement as true, or as 
representing knowledge. This entire conception about knowledge refutes itself, but the most 
significant aspect of this paradox is its pragmatic dimension (there is no logical or formal 
inconsistency to be found in this paradox): this view about knowledge simply fails to meet its 
own standards.  
[8] By maximal reconstruction of an argument, I refer to a strategy of reconstructing arguments 
with unexpressed premises similar to what Van Eemeren and Grootendorst call pragmatic 
optimum (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 60-72). 
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